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Key points
•	 The	geographic,	political,	military	and	economic	parameters	
of	 German	 power	 influence	 the	 vision	 of	 the	 international	
order	that	the	country	favours.	Due	to	its	central geographic	
location	in	the	‘European	area	of	stability’,	a	direct	territorial	
threat	 to	Germany	 involving	military	means	 is	perceived	 to	
be	 unlikely. German	 susceptibility	 to	 asymmetric	 risks	 and	
threats	(uncontrolled	migrations,	social	radicalisation,	organ-
ised	terrorism)	is	also	relatively	small.	Politically,	Germany	is	
a	regional	power	in	the	EU	with	considerable	diplomatic	po-
tential.	At	the	same	time,	Germany’s	military	potential	is	lim-
ited,	 the	German	 strategic	 culture	makes	 the	 country	 scep-
tical	 about	 the	use	of	military	 instruments,	 and	Berlin	does	
not	 possess	 nuclear	weapons.	 Economically,	Germany	 is	 the	
world’s	 third	 largest	 power	 with	 export-oriented	 economic	
model	 that	 increasingly	 influences	 the	choice	of	 its	strategic	
priorities.	Berlin,	which	over	 the	 last	 ten	years	has	been	 fo-
cused	on	economic	expansion	within	the	enlarged	EU,	is	now	
gradually	 becoming	 a	 country	with	 global	 trade	 and	 invest-
ment	 links.	 Considering	 this,	 Germany	 is	 essentially	 inter-
ested	in	maintaining	peace	and	stability,	both	in	Europe	and	
globally,	and	in	developing	diplomatic	mechanisms	to	manage	
crises	and	conflicts.	
•	 In	the	global	dimension,	Germany’s	top	objective	is	to	develop	
and	strengthen	security	co-operation	with	the	emerging	pow-
ers.	Berlin	does	not	want	their	political	and	economic	develop-
ment	and	growing	 international	 ambitions	 to	prompt	global	
crises	 or	 conflicts.	 Economic	 security,	 which	 for	 Germany	
means	mainly	resource	security	and	global	supply	chain	secu-
rity,	is	equally	important.	In	turn,	crisis	and	conflict	manage-
ment	outside	Europe	is	of	 lesser	significance	for	Berlin.	Ger-
many	transfers	responsibility	for	that	to	regional	powers	and	
organisations	in	their	respective	regions.	In	securing	its	inter-
ests	globally,	Germany	mainly	relies	on	civilian	instruments	
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and	 bilateral	 co-operation	 in	 specific	 sectors,	 as	well	 as	 co-
operation	with	regional	and	international	organisations,	with	
minimum	military	involvement	on	its	own	part.	
•	 Germany’s	 policy	may	 increasingly	pose	 a	 risk	 to	maintain-
ing	the	cohesion	of	NATO	in	the	global	dimension.	On	the	one	
hand,	Germany	faces	the	temptation	to	put	political	and	eco-
nomic	 relations	 with	 the	 emerging	 powers	 above	 relations	
with	 the	 USA.	 Deepening	 political	 and	 economic	 relations	
with	emerging	powers	may	leave	Germany	facing	difficult	po-
litical,	economic	and	military	choices	in	the	long	term,	should	
global	crises	or	conflicts	arise	between	the	new	partners	(such	
as	 China)	 and	 the	 ‘old’	 allies	 (the	USA).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	
Germany’s	 aversion	 to	using	military	 instruments	 leaves	 its	
European	 partners,	 particularly	 France	 and	 Great	 Britain,	
questioning	German	solidarity	and	willingness	to	participate	
in	crisis	management,	especially	in	Europe’s	southern	neigh-
bourhood.	Due	to	the	differences	in	strategic	cultures,	Euro-
pean	 military	 integration	 simultaneously	 involving	 France,	
Great	Britain	and	Germany	 is	highly	unlikely	 to	happen.	As	
a	result,	the	landscape	of	military	co-operation	in	Europe	will	
be	increasingly	fragmented	in	the	long	run.
•	 In	the	regional	dimension,	Germany	has	hitherto	followed	the	
principle	that	‘security	in	Europe	is	only	possible	with	Russia,	
not	against	it’.	It	has	been	developing	the	policy	of	a	‘common	
neighbourhood’	 in	Eastern	Europe	and	a	pursing	a	policy	of	
‘not	 provoking’	 Russia	 on	NATO’s	 eastern	flank.	 Berlin	 held	
the	view	that	Eastern	European	states	should	not	be	offered	
prospects	of	membership	in	NATO	and	the	EU,	but	should	be	
able	to	develop	economic	co-operation	with	both	the	EU	and	
Russia.	The	Russian-Ukrainian	conflict	has	shown	two	things.	
On	the	one	hand,	it	demonstrated	that	Germany	has	been	will-
ing	 to	make	concessions	 to	Russia	 at	 the	expense	of	 its	 own	
interests	and	those	of	the	EU	(postponing	the	implementation	
of	and	modifying	the	DCFTA)	and	at	the	expense	of	Ukraine	
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(which	has	ended	up	with	a	de facto	frozen	conflict	in	its	east-
ern	 regions).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 German	 government	
has	decided	 to	 implement	 and	maintain	 economic	 sanctions	
against	Russia.	With	regard	to	NATO’s	eastern	flank,	Germany	
considers	any	measures	aimed	at	considerably	strengthening	
the	allied	military	presence	there	as	provocative	and	prone	to	
escalate	tensions	between	Russia	and	the	West.
•	 Germany’s	 policy	 of	 de-escalation	 in	 the	 Russian-Ukrainian	
conflict	 and	 its	 efforts	 to	 limit	NATO’s	military	presence	 on	
the	eastern	flank,	combined	with	the	reports	about	the	Bun-
deswehr’s	problems	with	military	equipment,	 is	challenging	
the	sense	of	security	on	NATO’s	eastern	flank.	It	gives	rise	to	
questions	about	how	Germany	would	respond	politically	and	
militarily	if	Russia	was	to	undertake	more	aggressive	action	
in	the	Baltic	Sea	region	and	Central	Eastern	Europe.	Moscow	
considers	 Berlin	 to	 be	 a	 partner	who	 –	 facing	Russian	mili-
tary	pressure	–	might	be	inclined	to	negotiate	a	change	to	the	
European	security	architecture	at	 the	expense	of	 the	 sover-
eignty	 of	 the	 eastern	 NATO	members.	 This	 encourages	 the	
Russian	leadership	to	pursue	its	strategic	objective	by	testing	
and	undermining	NATO’s	ability	to	meet	its	commitments	in	
the	region.	Uncertainty	about	how	Germany	would	react	in	the	
event	of	a	crisis	or	conflict	in	the	region	makes	the	smaller	and	
medium-sized	partners	ambivalent	 about	developing	deeper	
military-technical	co-operation	with	Germany.
•	 Germany	 is	 a	 key	 ally	 on	 whom	 the	 stability	 and	 peace	 on	
NATO’s	eastern	flank	largely	depend.	Increased	German	polit-
ical	and	military	involvement	in	the	Baltic	Sea	region	and	Cen-
tral	Eastern	Europe,	as	a	demonstration	to	Russia	that	Berlin	
is	prepared	to	react	strongly,	could	discourage	any	aggressive	
Russian	action	on	NATO’s	eastern	flank. However,	it	remains	
an	open	question	as	to	whether,	following	the	Russian	annex-
ation	of	Crimea	and	armed	 intervention	 in	eastern	Ukraine,	
Germany	is	ready	to	change	its	security	policy,	which	in	turn	
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would	require	unpopular	political,	military	and	economic	de-
cisions	(such	as	endorsing	the	policy	of	deterrence,	strength-
ening	 the	 Bundeswehr’s	 military	 capabilities,	 and	 reducing	
the	existing	dependencies	on	Russian	companies	 in	key	sec-
tors	of	the	German	economy).	
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i. the determinants  
of German security policy
(1) Germany’s central location in the ‘european area of sta-
bility’ (i.e.	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 European	 part	 of	 NATO)	 defines 
the German perception of the risks and threats facing the 
country.	 The	 enlargement	 of	NATO	 and	 the	 EU	 that	 included	
Germany’s	 eastern	neighbours	made	 the	Germans	 feel	 secure.	
a direct territorial threat to Germany involving military 
means has been perceived to be unlikely	in	the	eyes	of	the	po-
litical	elite	and	the	German	public,	as	reflected	in	the	Ministry	
of	Defence	strategic	documents	of	recent	years1.	This	perception	
has	not	changed	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Russian-Ukrainian	con-
flict	 in	2014.	thus, Germany has focused on indirect trans-
border risks and threats stemming from globalisation, such	
as	 uncontrolled	 migrations,	 social	 radicalisation	 or	 organised	
terrorism	resulting	from	the	disintegration	of	states,	civil	wars,	
regional	conflicts	or	natural	disasters. However,	Germany	is	ex-
posed	to	such	indirect	risks	and	threats	to	a	much	lesser	extent	
than	countries	 like	France,	 Italy	or	Great	Britain.	This is	most	
apparent	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 no	 terror	 attacks	 have	 yet	 been	 car-
ried	out	 in	Germany,	and	that	German	counterintelligence	has	
been	able	to	keep	the	radical	Islamist	networks	under	effective	
surveillance.	Germany’s	central	position	in	the	EU	and	the	lack	
of	 post-colonial	 links	 to	Africa	 or	 the	Middle	East	 are	 the	 two	
factors	 that	diminish	 the	 influx	of	 illegal	migrants	 from	areas	
affected	 by	 crises	 and	 conflicts.	 The	 Islamic	 State’s	 (ISIL/ISIS)	
offensive	 in	 the	Middle	East	 in	 2014	has	 resulted	 in	a	 surge	 in	
refugee	numbers	from	the	region	also	in	Germany.	However,	mi-
gration	to	Germany	stems	mainly	from	European	countries	(in-
cluding	Turkey,	Russia	and	countries	of	the	former	Yugoslavia).	
1	 White	Paper	on	German	Security	Policy	and	the	Future	of	the	Bundeswehr	
issued	in	2006,	the	Defence	Policy	Guidelines	of	2011	and	the	Bundeswehr	
Concept	Paper	published	in	2013	by	the	German	Ministry	of	Defence.
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Of	more	than	7.6	million	migrants	without	German	citizenship	
in	2013,	up	to	6	million	came	from	Europe2.	
(2) historical, social and internal factors that	shape	the	pref-
erences	of	 the	political	 elite	 and	 the	public	 and	define	 the	 stra-
tegic	 culture	determine Germany’s choice of security policy 
instruments.	 Because	 of	 the	 experience	 of	 Nazism	 and	World	
War	II	and	the	political	tradition	of	West	Germany	defining	itself	
as	a	‘civilian	power’,	it is	difficult for the German government 
to win	 the	 public’s support for the use of the Bundeswehr 
abroad.	Moreover,	it	is	a	widely	held	view	among	German	deci-
sion-makers	that	strengthening the Bundeswehr and stepping 
up Germany’s foreign military engagement, combined with 
the country’s economic prowess, could lead to an overwhelm-
ing imbalance of power in europe.	That,	in	turn,	could	re-ignite	
processes	 unfavourable	 to	 Germany,	 such	 as	 the	 emergence	 of	
European	coalitions	aimed	at	counterbalancing	German	political,	
economic	and	military	strength.	Germany’s	security	policy	is	also	
shaped	by	the	federal	system3	and	the	culture	of	consensus,	which	
has	been	practiced	particularly	meticulously	during	Angela	Mer-
kel’s	 rule	 (the	CDU/CSU-SPD	coalitions	 in	 the	years	 2005–2009,	
CDU/CSU-FDP	 in	 the	 years	 2009–2013	 and	 CDU/CSU-SPD	 since	
2013).	 The	 decisions	 concerning	German	military	 (non-)engage-
ment	abroad	are	 thus	partly	a	product	of	 the	country’s	 internal	
politics,	especially	during	the	periods	of	federal	or	state	elections.	
In	 order	 to	 prevent	 situations	 in	 which	 sensitive	 issues	 would	
be	exploited	in	the	political	struggle	at	the	federal	or	state	level,	
the	coalition governments have taken care to obtain broad 
2	 Around	 1	million	come	 from	Asia,	and	300,000	 from	Africa.	Statistisches	
Bundesamt,	Ausländische	Bevölkerung,	1	December	2013.
https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoel-
kerung/MigrationIntegration/AuslaendischeBevolkerung/Tabellen/Ge-
burtsort.html	
3	 The	federal	system	was	imposed	on	West	Germany	by	the	Allies	after	World	
War	II	also	as	a	way	to	ensure	self-restraint	in	the	country’s	post-war	for-
eign	and	security	policy.
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inter-party agreement and the public support on security 
and defence policy questions, and have avoided controversial 
decisions.
finally, historical and social factors also play a role in the 
way Germany shapes its foreign and security policy with 
regard to russia. On	the	one	hand,	the	course	and	aftermath	of	
World	War	II	(Germany’s	defeat	on	the	Eastern	front,	the	Soviet	
occupation,	the	Cold	War	and	the	division	into	two	German	states)	
make	Germany	reluctant	to	undertake	any	actions	that	the	Ger-
man	public	could	interpret	as	a	return	to	wartime	or	a	Cold	War-
style	confrontation	with	Russia.	This	attitude	is	also	influenced	by	
Germany’s	distorted	memory	of	the	Russian	(but	not	Ukrainian	or	
Belarusian)	victims	of	 the	crimes	committed	by	Nazi	Germany.	
On	top	of	 that,	 there	 is	 the	conviction	that	the	policy	of	détente	
towards	 the	USSR	was	 the	most	 important	 factor	 in	ending	 the	
Cold	War	and	in	German	reunification.	This	has	produced	a	deep-
ly	rooted	belief	that	Germany	itself	and	Europe	as	a	whole	should	
pursue	a	policy	of	dialogue	and	co-operation	towards	Russia,	also	
in	times	of	crisis.	
(3) the German economic model has a great impact on the 
strategic priorities of Germany’s foreign and security policy. 
The	country’s	highly	industrialised	economy	is	characterised	by	
a	 strong	 orientation towards exports (mainly	 of	 investment	
goods,	which	accounted	for	44.1%	of	total	exports	in	2013)4	and	is 
heavily dependent on imports of natural resources (energy	
resources	and	metals).
Germany’s foreign trade is still highly ‘europeanised’;	 its	
ten	main	trading	partners	are	Western	states	(France,	the	Neth-
erlands,	USA,	Great	Britain,	 Italy,	Austria),	with	the	sole	excep-
tion	of	China	–	Germany’s	third	largest	trading	partner.	In	2013,	
4	 Bund	 der	 Deutschen	 Industrie,	 Exportstruktur	 der	 deutschen	 Industrie	
2013,	http://www.bdi.eu/RD-EXT/ZahlenFakten/Exportstruktur.pdf	
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European	countries	accounted	for	69%	of	Germany’s	exports,	in-
cluding	59%	for	the	EU	countries.5	The	ten	 largest	sales	markets	
for	German	goods	were	also	mostly	Western	countries,	again	with	
the	exception	of	China	–	Germany’s	fifth	largest	export	destina-
tion.6	However,	the dynamics of Germany’s foreign trade with 
the emerging powers (in recent years mainly china)	is much 
higher than with the Western partners.	 Germany	 perceives	
not	only	the	BRICS	countries	as	increasingly	important	economic	
and	political	partners.	This	 applies	 also	 to	 regional	players	 like	
Vietnam,	 Mexico,	 Malaysia,	 Indonesia,	 Columbia,	 Nigeria	 and	
Angola.7 Germany, which over the last ten years has been fo-
cused on economic expansion within the enlarged eu, is now 
gradually becoming a country with global trade and invest-
ment links.	
Germany imports between 70% and 98% of the energy re-
sources and nearly 100% of the metals it consumes.	the coun-
try relies increasingly on global interdependencies to import 
these resources. With	 regard	 to	 energy	 resources, Germany	 is	
seeking	to	diversify	its	energy	suppliers	and	supply	routes	and	in-
crease	the	share	of	renewables	in	its	energy	mix	through	the	Ener-
giewende	project.	As	regards	metals,	since	2010	Germany	has	been	
implementing	a	strategy	which	aims	at	greater	diversification	of	
5	 16%	 of	 exports	 are	 destined	 for	 Asian	 countries,	 and	 12%	 to	 countries	 of	
North	and	South	America.
6	 The	top	three	are	France,	the	USA	and	Great	Britain.	Statistisches	Bundes-
amt,	 Außenhandel.	 Rangfolge	 der	 Handelspartner	 im	 Außenhandel	 der	
Bundesrepublik	Deutschland	2013,	Wiesbaden	2014,	https://www.destatis.
de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/Aussenhandel/Handel-
spartner/Tabellen/RangfolgeHandelspartner.pdf?__blob=publicationFile;	
Statistisches	Bundesamt,	 ‘Frankreich	auch	2013	Deutschlands	wichtigster	
Handelspartner’,	 https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Gesamtwirt-
schaftUmwelt/Aussenhandel/Handelspartner/Aktuell.html	
7	 Countries	 named	 in	 the	 federal	 government’s	 2012	 strategy	 paper	 on	 the	
development	of	co-operation	with	emerging	powers.	Die	Bundesregierung,	
’Shaping	Globalization	–	Expanding	Partnerships	–	Sharing	Responsibility.	
A	strategy	paper	by	the	German	Government’,	2012,	https://www.auswaer-
tiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/616584/publicationFile/190268/Ge-
staltungsmaechtekonzept%20engl.pdf	
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supplies	and	envisages	the	conclusion	of	long-term	‘raw	material	
partnerships’	with	selected	countries.8	
Russia is	still	perceived	as	a	major	export	market	for	German	in-
vestment	goods,	even	though	in	reality	it	is	only	Germany’s	10th	
or	 11th	 largest	 trading	 partner	 (interchangeably	 with	 Poland).9	
Moreover,	 as	 German	 companies	 switch	 to	 non-European	mar-
kets,	the	relative importance of the russian market for Ger-
man exports is decreasing	(despite	the	rise	in	German	exports	
to	and	investments	in	Russia	in	recent	years).	Russia	is	the	larg-
est	 supplier	 of	 resources	 to	Germany;	 it	 accounts	 for	 a	 third	 of	
the	country’s	oil	and	gas	imports	(37%	and	32%,	respectively)	and	
much	of	its	imports	of	hard	coal	and	metals. However,	due	to	the	
diversification	of	energy	supplies	and	the	‘green’	energy	transfor-
mation	mentioned	above,	combined	with	expanding	‘raw	materi-
als	partnerships’,	the	importance of russia as a supplier of re-
sources to Germany will decrease in the long term.	
(4) the political, economic and military parameters of Ger-
man power influence the vision of the international order 
8	 Within	 the	 framework	 of	 those	 partnerships,	 Germany	 seeks	 access	 to	
deposits	 of	 raw	 materials	 in	 return	 for	 investments,	 technology	 trans-
fers	or	development	 aid.	To	date,	 such	partnerships	have	been	 concluded	
with	Kazakhstan,	Mongolia,	Chile	and	Peru,	while	Russia	and	China	still	
remain	 important	partners	 for	Germany.	Konrad	Popławski,	 ‘Germany	 is	
consistently	implementing	its	strategy	of	raw	material	partnerships’,	OSW 
Analyses,	 6	 February	 2013,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2013-02-06/germany-consistently-implementing-its-strategy-raw-ma-
terial.	See	also	Anna	Kwiatkowska-Drożdż,	‘The	natural	resources	deficit:	
the	 implications	 for	 German	 politics’,	OSW Commentary,	 8	 February	 2011,	
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-02-08/nat-
ural-resources-deficit-implications-german-politics	
9	 A	comparison	of	Germany’s	 foreign	trade	with	Russia	and	with	the	coun-
tries	of	the	Visegrad	Group	(Poland,	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hun-
gary	[V4])	clearly	favours	the	latter.	In	2013	Germany	exported	a	total	of	€101	
billion	worth	of	goods	 to	 the	V4	and	€36	billion	worth	of	goods	 to	Russia.	
For	imports,	the	proportions	are	as	follows:	Germany	imported	around	€100	
billion	worth	of	goods	from	the	V4	and	around	€40	billion	worth	of	goods	
from	 Russia.	 See	 Statistisches	 Bundesamt,	 https://www.destatis.de/DE/
Startseite.html	
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that the country favours.	 Politically,	 Germany	 is	 a	 regional	
power	 in	 the	 EU	 with	 considerable	 diplomatic	 potential.	 Eco-
nomically	it	is	the	world’s	third	largest	power.	At	the	same	time,	
Germany’s	military	potential	is	limited,	and	the	country	does	not	
possess	nuclear	weapons.	Therefore, Berlin is essentially inter-
ested in maintaining peace and stability, both in europe and 
globally, and in developing diplomatic mechanisms to man-
age crises and conflicts.	For	these	reasons,	Germany	is	willing	
to	involve	the	emerging	powers	in	the	shaping	of	the	global	order,	
even	if	that	entails	taking	the	interests	of	those	powers	into	ac-
count	to	a	greater	extent.	Germany	opts	for	multilateralism	and	
multipolarity	in	international	relations.
As	a	result,	Germany’s	attitude towards the united states has 
been increasingly ambivalent.	The	USA	 is	 still	 an	ally	within	
NATO,	with	whom	Germany	maintains	military	links,	and	an	im-
portant	 political	 and	 economic	 partner.	However	 in the global 
context, the USA’s	ambition	to	keep	its	dominant	position	in	the	
international	 order,	 its	 propensity	 to	 act	 unilaterally	 and	 bend	
international	law,	and	its	ambition	to	contain	potential	rivals,	is	
seen	in	Germany	as	potentially	threatening	to	German	interests.	
in the european context,	Germany	no	longer	regards	the	USA	as	
the	guarantor	of	European	security.	On	the	contrary,	US	policy	in	
Europe	is	at	times	perceived	as	a	factor	that	could	destabilise	Eu-
ropean-Russian	relations.	The	German	political	elites	do	not	con-
sider	the	shrinking	US	presence	in	Europe	as	a	factor	that	could	
have	a	negative	 impact	on	European	security.10	Rather,	 the	Ger-
mans	view	this	process	as	a	natural	consequence	of	the	end	of	the	
Cold	War.	This	perception	of	the	USA	also	stems	partly	from	the	
fact	that	Germany	is	disinclined	to	undertake	high-end	military	
10	 See	the	speech	by	Thomas	de	Maizière	at	the	48th	Munich	Security	Conference,	
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NY3BCoMwEET_KDG2Qtt-
bxUN7K16svYQYl7hgEtmsFko_vlpwBt7lDYx8ybXBLOgMYwxmlE_
ZWrx0b9H5xQmPARMD4eyFg2QHtAOD_rsFiAF7dHNwaR_qBMh-
anYtC8BC9SboH7Q1-EAhks931IGwMwBsZAuNKR4YjiSkSj5uZiVYjs-
JdtpqoyU9ke9T3Vx9ujOeR5dS9rOXl__QGGZ_vR/
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
/2
01
5
15
operations	abroad,	and	is	therefore	less	reliant	on	the	US	military	
capabilities	 to	 support	 them.	 This	 ambivalent	 attitude	 towards	
the	US	is	further	reinforced	by	the	anti-Americanism	of	the	Ger-
man	public,	a	legacy	of	the	pacifist	movements	co-financed	by	the	
USSR	during	the	Cold	War,	which	has	been	amplified	by	the	nega-
tive	reception	of	the	US	foreign	military	interventions	in	the	last	
two	decades	and	recently	by	the	spying	scandal	from	2013.11
11	 According	to	the	Pew	Research	Center,	Germany	is	in	the	top-ten	of	coun-
tries	that	criticise	US	policy:	it	occupies	10th	place,	with	47%	of	respondents	
reporting	negative	 attitudes	 towards	 the	US	and	 51%	 reporting	 a	positive	
attitude.	See	Bruce	Stokes,	‘Which	countries	don’t	like	America	and	which	
do’,	 Pew	Research	Center,	 15	 July	 2014,	http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/07/15/which-countries-dont-like-america-and-which-do/	
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ii. the GloBal dimension of Germany’s 
security policy
1.  German concepts for global security 
(1) co-operative security. The	concept	of	co-operative	security,	
based	 on	 co-operation	 and	 dialogue,	was	 present	 in	 Germany’s	
policy	with	regard	to	the	East-West	relations	during	the	Cold	War	
and	afterwards.	In	recent	years,	its	global	dimension	has	gained	
more	 significance.	Germany’s	 interest	 is	 primarily	 in	 strength-
ening	 and	 developing	 co-operation	 with	 the	 emerging	 powers.	
Berlin	 does	 not	 want	 their	 (especially	 the	 BRICS)	 political	 and	
economic	 development	 and	 growing	 international	 ambitions	 to	
prompt	global	crises	or	conflicts	that	could	leave	Germany	facing	
difficult	 choices.	 For	 this	 reason,	co-operative security in the 
global (and regional) dimension remains the area of nato’s 
activity to which Germany is most committed. For	Berlin	this	
is	in	fact more	important	than	NATO’s	other	core	tasks:	collective	
defence	and	crisis	management.	Germany	deems	it	highly	impor-
tant	 to	 develop	 instruments	 which	 strengthen	 global	 stability	
and	prevent	crises	and	conflicts	between	NATO/the	USA	and	the	
emerging	powers.	These	 include	political	dialogue	and	military	
co-operation	with	elements	of	arms	control,	confidence-building	
measures	or	joint	military	exercises.	Germany	will	increasingly	
pursue	such	co-operation	on	a	bilateral	basis	(also	to	the	benefit	of	
its	own	arms	industry)	through	military-technical	co-operation,	
training	support	provided	by	the	Bundeswehr	or	joint	armaments	
projects.
(2) crisis management the German way	 – vernetzte Sicher-
heit. Germany’s	 attitude	 towards	 the	 management	 of	 regional	
crises	 and	 conflicts	 (e.g.	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 and	Africa)	 results	
from	German	thinking	in	terms	of	co-operative	security.	Berlin 
views any direct military intervention into internal or re-
gional conflicts as the last resort.	Germany	considers	military	
interventions	of	this	kind	to	be	ineffective,	involve	a	high	human	
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and	material	cost,	and	be	incompatible	with	the	German	interests	
and	strategic	culture.	Germany has thus been developing a pol-
icy of networked security, the so-called vernetzte Sicherheit. 
The	 German	 leadership	 prefers	 regional	 powers	 and	 organisa-
tions	to	assume	responsibility	for	military	crisis	management	in	
their	respective	regions.	It	prefers	to	support	such	actors	in	con-
flict	prevention,	crisis	and	conflict	management	and	post-conflict	
situations	by	providing	military	equipment,	organising	military	
training	missions,	supporting	security	reforms,	or	sending	in	mil-
itary	advisors.12	Moreover,	Germany	advocates a more extensive 
use of civilian instruments	in	the	domains	of	diplomacy,	devel-
opment	 co-operation,	 justice	 (training	 of	 police	 officers,	 judges,	
prosecutors),	economic	co-operation,	infrastructure	development	
and	environmental	protection.	This	approach	is	popular	with	the	
German	public,	 as	 demonstrated	by	 the	detailed	public	 opinion	
polls	conducted	in	April	and	May	2014.13	The	survey	showed	that	
Germans	mostly	want	 their	government	 to	conduct	 foreign	and	
security	policy	using	civilian	 instruments	 (humanitarian	assis-
tance,	diplomacy,	civil	society	support,	etc.).	There	 is	very	 little	
support	for	using	military	means:	82%	of	respondents	believe	that	
the	Bundeswehr’s	engagement	abroad	should	be	limited.	
(3) resource security and global supply chain security. The	
increase	in	Germany’s	global	economic	interdependencies	makes	
12	 The	German	proposals	presented	ahead	of	the	European	Council	meeting	in	
December	2013	were	in	line	with	this	policy:	(1)	transforming	one	of	the	two	
EU	Battle	Groups	(EUBG)	into	a	training	unit	for	the	purposes	of	training	
missions	(this	proposal	will	probably	be	partly	put	into	practice	in	the	form	
of	a	training	module	within	an	EUBG	that	will	retain	its	current	format);	
(2)	the	‘enable & enhance’	initiative	in	the	EU,	which	aims	at	preventative	and	
post-conflict	training	and	material	support	(armament	and	military	equip-
ment)	 for	 regional	partners	 that	 could	contribute	 to	ensuring	 security	 in	
crisis	regions	(e.g.	Nigeria	in	the	context	of	ensuring	security	in	the	Gulf	of	
Guinea,	or	Kenya	with	regard	to	permanent	instability	in	Somalia).	
13	 Körber-Stiftung,	Einmischen	oder	zurückhalten?	Ergebnisse	einer	reprä-
sentativen	 Umfrage	 von	 TNS	 Infratest	 Politikforschung	 zur	 Sicht	 der	
Deutschen	auf	die	Außenpolitik,	May	2014,	http://www.koerber-stiftung.
de/internationale-politik/sonderthemen/umfrage-aussenpolitik.html	
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the	 country	more	 reliant	 on	 international	 transport	 routes,	 es-
pecially	by	air	and	sea.	This	is	why	in	security	policy	debates	in	
Germany,	industry	representatives	(BDI)14	and	expert	communi-
ties	(SWP,	KAS)15	have	increasingly	emphasised	the	need for Ger-
many to become more involved in securing the global flows 
of goods and services and developing a new security policy 
narrative on securing the ‘global commons’.	 Such	 a	 strategy	
should	 rely	on	preventative	 and	 response	 instruments,	 both	 ci-
vilian	and	military.	Since	 the	maritime	domain	 is	 of	particular	
importance	for	Germany16,	experts	have	been	calling	on	Germany	
to	assume	an	active	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	EU’s	Maritime	Security	
Strategy,	and	have	been	emphasising	the	need	for	 the	 following	
actions:	a	strengthening	of	Germany’s	political	and	military	pres-
ence	in	regions	of	significant	importance	from	the	point	of	view	of	
the	global	maritime	routes;	increasing	the	capabilities	of	the	Ger-
man	Navy	and	the	Coast	Guard;	building	up	maritime	and	satel-
lite	surveillance	capabilities;	and	pursuing	a	development	policy	
focused	on	good	governance and	 the rule	of	 law	 in	 the	 relevant	
regions.	Such	opinions	are	likely	to	gain	increasing	influence	on	
German	foreign	and	security	policy.	
there is thus wide agreement in Germany that the navy will 
be used more extensively in the future than it has been so far.	
14	 Bundesverband	der	Deutschen	 Industrie,	Grundsatzpapier.	Sicherheit	 für	
das	 Industrieland	 Deutschland,	 June	 2013,	 http://www.bdi.eu/download_
content/SicherheitUndVerteidigung/32782_BDI_Sicherheit_5.pdf
15	 Markus	Harder,	 ‘Anforderungen	an	eine	Europäische	Maritime	Sicherheits-
strategie’,	SWP-Aktuell,	July	2013,	http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/con	-	
tents/products/aktuell/2013A43_hae.pdf;	 Peter	 Hefele,	 ‘Fragile	 Wertschöp-
fungsketten:	 Zur	 Notwendigkeit	 eines	 deutschen	 maritimen	 Engagements’,	
Analysen	&	Argumente.	Perspektiven Deutscher Außenpolitik KAS,	 nr	 125,	 July	
2013,	http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_34915-544-1-30.pdf?130709104818
16	 In	recent	years	Germany	has	reported	an	increase	in	the	volume	and	value	
of	goods	imported	and	exported	by	sea.	In	2011	maritime	transport	account-
ed	 for	28.5%	of	German	exports	by	weight	and	 56.9%	of	 exports	by	value.	
Moreover,	 Germany	 is	 one	 of	 the	 top	 five	 largest	 logistics	 centres	 in	 the	
world.	The	position	of	the	German	merchant	navy	is	equally	strong:	it	is	the	
third-largest	in	the	world,	and	the	first	for	container	ships.
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Thus,	 compared	 to	 the	 other	 branches	 of	 the	 Bundeswehr,	 the	
German	Navy	was	least	affected	by	the	spending	cuts	implement-
ed	as	part	of	the	most	recent	Bundeswehr	reform	in	2011.	The	ob-
jective	 of	 the	 Navy’s	 capabilities	 development	 is	 to	 enhance	 its	
readiness,	 armament	 and	 equipment,	 and	 training	 levels,	 with	
a	view	to	preparing	the	forces	to	take	part	in	crisis	management	
and	 anti-pirate	 operations	 and	 to	 support	 land	operations	 from	
the	sea.	Regarding	the	security	of	international	maritime	routes,	
Germany	has	been	participating	in	the	NATO	(Ocean	Shield)	and	
EU	(Atalanta)	anti-pirate	operations	in	the	Horn	of	Africa.	It	also	
co-operates	with	the	United	States;	every	two	years,	a	German	air	
defence	Sachsen-class	frigate	(F	124)	takes	its	turn	to	escort	a	US	
carrier	strike	group	in	the	Persian	Gulf.	
2.  Germany’s priorities and the challenges for the allies
(1) Between old allies and new partners? The	deepening	po-
litical	and	economic	relations	with	emerging	powers	may	leave	
Germany	facing	difficult	political,	economic	and	military	choices	
in	the	long	term,	should	global	crises	or	conflicts	arise	between	
the	new	partners	(China)	and	the	‘old’	allies	(the	USA).	The	shift	
in	US	foreign	and	security	policy	towards	the	Asia-Pacific	region	
has	been	a	source	of	concern	in	Germany,	which	worries	about	
the	possible	consequences	of	US-Chinese	rivalry	for	German	po-
litical	 and	 economic	 relations	with	China.	 in the event of an 
escalation of the us-china conflict, Germany would have to 
make a geopolitical choice between supporting its ally, the 
usa, or remaining neutral. if it chose the latter, the deci-
sion could entail the disintegration of nato in the global 
dimension. 
potential scenarios of global crises and conflicts, as well as 
the possible scope and consequences of Germany’s response, 
are being considered and analysed in Berlin;	the	policy	game	
with	 a	 scenario	 of	 a	massive	 Chinese	 cyber-attack	 on	 US	 criti-
cal	 infrastructure	 in	a	 tense	 international	 situation	 is	a	 case	 in	
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point.17	In	such	situations,	Germany	may	differ	from	the	USA	in	its	
interpretation	of	the	causes	of	the	conflict	and	may	take	different	
political,	economic	and	military	action.	It	may	be	more	inclined	
to	adopt	a	neutral	position	or	act	as	an	intermediary	between	the	
parties.	 In	 a	 simulation	 of	 the	 above	 scenario	 conducted	 in	 the	
autumn	of	2011,	Germany	tried	to	mediate	between	the	USA	and	
China	in	the	first	phase	of	the	conflict;	in	the	second	phase,	it	de-
clared	solidarity	with	the	USA	but	did	not	commit	to	uncondition-
ally	participating	in	all	US	actions.18	In	the	longer	run,	the	behav-
iour	of	the	German	government	in	real	situations	of	this	kind	will	
depend	on	many	factors	including	the	status	of	its	relations	with	
the	USA	and	China,	the	set-up	of	the	ruling	coalition,	or	the	inter-
nal	political	situation	in	Germany.	
the signing and implementation of the transatlantic trade 
and investment partnership (ttip) will be of key importance 
for anchoring Germany in the West, including within nato. 
The	TTIP	is	expected	to	strengthen	economic	links	between	the	
United	States	and	the	EU,	Germany	in	particular,	and	to	have	far-
reaching	geopolitical	implications.	For	Germany,	the	TTIP	will	ce-
ment	links	with	the	USA	and	weaken	the	temptation	to	deepen	co-
operation	with	the	emerging	powers	at	the	expense	of	relations	
with	the	West.	It	is	of	utmost	importance	that	the	TTIP	is	signed	
and	ratified	during	the	term	of	the	current	coalition	government	
led	by	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel.	Currently,	representatives	of	in-
dustry	and	leading	government	officials	from	the	coalition	parties	
(the	CDU/CSU	and	the	SPD)	are	in	favour	of	the	agreement.	How-
ever,	while	the	CDU/CSU’s	party	members	fully	endorse	the	TTIP,	
many	 Social	 Democrats	 are	 sceptical,	 with	 the	 German	 public	
17	 Körber-Stiftung,	 ‘Deutschland	zwischen	China	und	den	USA:	Handlungs-
optionen	in	einer	bipolaren	Weltordnung’,	Körber Policy Game	No	1,	October	
2011,	http://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/internation-
ale_politik/pdf/2011/Policy%20Game-2011.pdf	
18	 In	this	policy	game	‘Germany’	was	represented	by	young	experts	and	advis-
ers	from	federal	ministries,	think	tanks	and	German	companies.	
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being	overwhelmingly	critical	of	the	agreement.19	Thus,	after	the	
2017	parliamentary	elections	in	Germany,	the	government’s	atti-
tude	towards	the	TTIP	may	become	more	distanced.	It	is	also	pos-
sible	that	Russia,	which	is	not	 interested	 in	a	greater	consolida-
tion	of	 the	West,	will	 organise	propaganda	campaigns	 that	will	
primarily	 target	Germany	and	present	 the	balance	of	 costs	 and	
benefits	of	the	TTIP	in	a	negative	light.	
(2) european solidarity in crisis management? Germany’s 
preference	 for	 civilian	 instruments	 in	 dealing	 with	 crises	 and	
conflicts	has	led	to	questions	being	raised	about	Germany’s	soli-
darity	 and	willingness	 to	 participate	 in	 crisis	management,	 es-
pecially	 in	the	EU’s	southern	neighbourhood.	from the french 
and British perspective, Germany has been ‘free-riding’ and	
taking	advantage	of	French	and	British	military	 involvement	 in	
crisis	management	which	enhances	the	security	of	the	entire	EU.	
From	 the	 German	 perspective,	 the	 results	 of	 such	 involvement	
have	 been	 ambiguous,	 and	 the	Bundeswehr	 should	not	 be	 used	
to	 secure	 other	 countries’,	 i.e.	 France	 and	Britain’s,	 interests	 in	
their	former	colonies.	Berlin’s	position	on	Libya	in	2011	was	a	par-
ticularly	striking	example	of	Germany’s	refusal	to	participate	in	
international	 crisis	 management.	 Germany	 (along	 with	 China	
and	 Russia)	 abstained	 from	 voting	 at	 the	 UN	 Security	 Council	
(UNSC)	on	a	British-	and	French-backed	resolution	 to	authorise	
the	military	 intervention,	and	decided	not	 to	 join	 the	operation	
led	by	NATO.	The	decision	caused	controversy	within	Germany	
also,	and	left	the	country	feeling	isolated	from	its	main	allies	–	the	
USA,	France	and	Great	Britain.	
19	 Konrad	Popławski,	 ‘The	SPD	presents	 its	conditions	regarding	the	accept-
ance	 of	 the	TTIP’,	OSW Analyses,	 1	October	 2014,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/analyses/2014-10-01/spd-presents-its-conditions-regard-
ing-acceptance-ttip;	David	Böcking,	 ‘Freihandelsabkommen:	CDU	rechnet	
sich	 TTIP-Prognosen	 schön’,	 22	 September	 2014,	 http://www.spiegel.de/
wirtschaft/soziales/ttip-cdu-bewirbt-freihandel-mit-wackligen-zahlen-
a-993107.html	
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In	the	aftermath	of	the	Libya	crisis,	Germany has thus adopted	
a strategy of minimum military involvement in internation-
al crisis management operations. Officially,	Germany	has	en-
dorsed	operations	with	the	UNSC	mandate	conducted	by	NATO,	
individual	allies	or	regional	organisations. Practically, its actual 
military involvement in such operations has been minimal 
and limited to strategic and tactical airlift, logistics, medical 
support, military training and, more recently, arms deliver-
ies.	Bundeswehr	involvement	in	the	operations	in	Mali,	Somalia,	
the	Central	African	Republic	 and	 Iraq	 offers	 a	 good	 illustration	
of	how	Germany	has	been	implementing	this	strategy	since	2011.	
It	seems	that	future	German	governments	will	stick	to	this	course.	
(3) integration of the european armed forces? Due	to	the	sig-
nificant	differences	in	the	strategic	cultures	and	security	policy	
priorities	 among	 the	 largest	 EU	member	 states,	military inte-
gration in europe involving france, Great Britain and Ger-
many is unlikely to happen. in the long run, this may lead 
to a growing fragmentation of military co-operation in eu-
rope.	 In	 November	 2010,	 France	 and	 Great	 Britain	 decided	 to	
strengthen	 their	 bilateral	military	 co-operation	 by	 signing	 the	
Lancaster	House	Treaty	 for	Defence	and	Security	Co-operation,	
and	in	2014	agreed	to	set	their	further	priorities.20	This	was	the	
result	 of	 growing	 frustration	 at	 the	 absence	 of	 progress	within	
the	 existing	 formats	 of	 political,	military	 and	 industrial	 co-op-
eration	within	the	EU.	Both	countries	also	concluded	that	it	was	
not	worth	investing	in	closer	political-military	co-operation	with	
Germany.	Due	to	German	security	policy	priorities	and	internal	
restraints,	Paris	and	London	simply	do	not	see	Berlin	as	a	reliable	
partner	who	could	guarantee	that	the	fruits	of	closer	military	co-
operation	in	peace	time	would	translate	into	real	co-operation	in	
20	 Ministry	of	Defence,	‘UK-France	Defence	Co-operation	Treaty	announced’,	
2	October	2010,	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-defence-
co-operation-treaty-announced--2;	Prime	Minister’s	Office,	‘UK	and	France	
agree	 closer	 defence	 co-operation’,	 31	 January	 2014,	 https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/uk-and-france-agree-closer-defence-co-operation	
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military	operations	at	times	of	crisis.	Also,	Berlin	is	reluctant	to	
start	far-reaching	military	co-operation	projects	with	France	and	
Great	Britain,	 since	 it	 fears	being	pressured	by	 these	 two	coun-
tries	 to	engage	capabilities	 involved	 in	 joint	projects	 in	military	
operations	abroad.	For	this	reason,	Germany currently prefers 
to pursue integration projects with smaller and medium-
sized countries in its neighbourhood – in the Benelux, the 
nordic-Baltic region or the Visegrad Group, where Germany 
is the stronger partner and can be a leader which defines the 
course and objectives of military integration.
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iii. the reGional dimension of Germany’s 
security policy 
1. German priorities in the Baltic sea region and central 
eastern europe
‘security in europe is only possible with russia, not against 
it’:	the	principle inscribed	into	the	coalition	agreement	of	the	cur-
rent	CDU/CSU-SPD	government,	says	a	great	deal	about	German	
security	policy	in	the	regional	dimension.21	Germany	regards	Rus-
sia	as	the	largest	and	most	important	neighbour	of	the	EU,	and	an	
important	actor	in	terms	of	international	security.	From	the	Ger-
man	perspective,	a	confrontation	with	Moscow	is	not	in	the	inter-
est	of	either	Germany	or	the	European	Union.	Despite	Russia’s	ag-
gression	against	Ukraine,	German	politicians	and	diplomats	keep	
reiterating	this	principle.22	On	the	other	hand,	it	appears	that	the	
Russian-Ukrainian	conflict	has	triggered	a	(limited)	public	debate	
in	Germany	about	the	adequacy	of	this	concept.	Despite	Germa-
ny’s	efforts	to	secure	a	political	resolution	to	the	conflict,	Russia	
has	continued	its	military	operations	in	eastern	Ukraine	and	car-
ried	on	with	the	political	measures	targeting	Ukraine	as	a	whole.	
This	has	left	Germany	increasingly	baffled	and	irritated	by	Rus-
sia’s	policy	and	its	broken	promises.	However, it is too early to 
say if Germany’s increasingly critical perception of russia 
will prompt the country to change the guiding principle of 
its policy towards moscow. it remains an open question as to 
21	 The	coalition	agreement	of	CDU,	CSU	and	SPD,	‘Deutschlands	Zukunft	ge-
stalten’,	 16	 December	 2013,	 https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/
dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf	
22	 Speech	by	Michael	Roth,	Secretary	of	State	for	European	Affairs	at	the	Ger-
man	Foreign	Ministry,	 ‘Germany	 in	 a	 changing	EU:	Outlining	Germany’s	
European	Union	Policy’,	22	September	2014,	http://www.auswaertiges-amt.
de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2014/140922_StMR_Dublin.html	
See	also	Anna	Kwiatkowska-Drożdż,	 ‘Germany	on	Russia.	Yes	to	links,	no	
to	rapprochement’,	OSW Point of View,	February	2014,	http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/policy-briefs/2014-03-03/germany-russia-yes-to-links-
no-to-rapprochement	
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whether Germany will be willing to consider the scenario of 
an act of more or less open russian aggression against one of 
nato’s eastern member states.	that would require Germany 
to fundamentally change its security policy, and would ne-
cessitate unpopular political, military and economic deci-
sions (endorsing	 a	 policy	 of	 deterrence,	 strengthening	German	
military	potential,	limiting	the	existing	dependencies	on	Russian	
companies	in	key	sectors	of	the	German	economy).	
(1) a ‘common neighbourhood’ in eastern europe. In	line	with	
the	principle	 that	 ‘security	 in	Europe	 is	only	possible	with	Rus-
sia,	not	against	it’,	until recently Germany viewed the eastern 
european states as a kind of eu-russian ‘common neighbour-
hood’ – without prospects of membership in nato and the 
eu, but able to develop economic co-operation with both the 
european union and russia.	In	recent	years,	Germany	has	unof-
ficially	opposed	the	idea	that	Ukraine	and	the	other	Eastern	Part-
nership	countries	could	join	NATO	or	the	EU.	At	the	same	time,	
it	has	not	 recognised	Russia’s	 exclusive	economic	dominance	 in	
those	countries.	Germany’s	objective	has	been	to	draw	them	part-
ly	into	the	orbit	of	the	EU’s	influence,	so	that	European	standards	
and	 legislation	 could	 contribute	 to	 reducing	 corruption	and	en-
hancing	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 for	 German/EU	 companies	 doing	 busi-
ness	there.	Thus,	Germany	has	supported	the	conclusion	of	Asso-
ciation	Agreements	between	the	EU	and	the	Eastern	Partnership	
countries,	which	are	also	supposed	to	include	provisions	on	Deep	
and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Areas	(DCFTA);	in	2007	Germany	
actually	came	forward	with	the	DCFTAs’	initiative.23
in the course of the russian-ukrainian conflict, it became 
clear that Germany’s priority was to prevent the conflict 
from escalating, and that to this end Berlin was willing to 
23	 Justyna	Gotkowska,	‘Germany	and	the	Eastern	Partnership’,	OSW Commen-
tary,	 18	 June	 2010,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-
tary/2010-06-18/germany-and-eastern-partnership	
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make compromises under russian pressure, giving up on its 
original vision of the ‘common neighbourhood’.	 It	was	of	ut-
most	 importance	 for	Germany	 to	make	sure	 that	 talks	between	
Ukraine	 and	 Russia	 continued	 (even	 including	 the	 separatists),	
a	ceasefire	was	agreed,	and	negotiations	were	opened	about	a	po-
litical	solution	to	the	conflict	–	at	the	expense	of	concessions	on	the	
part	of	the	Ukrainian	side.	Germany	was	also	prepared	to	partly	
give	up	the	plans	it	had	previously	endorsed	to	develop	closer	eco-
nomic	co-operation	between	the	EU	and	Ukraine,	and	was	ready	
to	accept	Russia’s	demands	to	postpone	the	implementation	of	the	
EU-Ukraine	agreement	on	 the	DCFTA,	and	 (most	probably)	also	
willing	 to	 accept	modifications	 to	 it.	at the same time, while 
Germany opposed military solutions and arms supplies to 
ukraine, it could not afford not to respond to moscow’s illegal 
actions, which threatened to unravel international treaties 
and the post-war security architecture in europe, because it 
would lose credibility in relations with russia and with the 
eu member states in the region.	Thus,	Germany	initially	offered	
only	 limited	support	for	the	sanctions	against	Russia,	assuming	
the	role	of	mediator	between	those	countries	that	were	sceptical	
about	the	sanctions,	and	those	calling	for	a	tougher	policy	on	Rus-
sia.	Germany	toughened	its	own	position	after	the	Russian	Armed	
Forces	 intervened	 in	 eastern	Ukraine;	 thanks	 to	 pressure	 from	
Chancellor	Angela	Merkel,	the	EU	agreed	a	new	package	of	sanc-
tions	against	Russian	nationals	and	entities	in	September	2014.24
(2) no ‘provocations’ on nato’s eastern flank. To	date,	Germa-
ny	has	held	the	view	that	Russia	could	not	pose	a	military	threat	to	
any	NATO	state.	Berlin	has	also	been	convinced	that	there	should	
be	no	reinforcement	of	the	Russian	narrative	about	Russia	being	
24	 The	German	 government	has	 also	 committed	 itself	 to	 deploying	up	 to	 20	
experts	and	police	officers	as	part	of	the	EU	Advisory	Mission	for	Civilian	
Security	Sector	Reform	Ukraine	(EUAM	Ukraine).	Moreover,	Germany	has	
pledged	military	equipment	(UAVs)	and	its	operators	(Bundeswehr	soldiers)	
to	monitor	 the	Russian-Ukrainian	 border	 as	 part	 of	 the	OSCE	mission	 in	
eastern	Ukraine.	
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encircled	and	threatened	by	NATO;	thus,	any	significant	military	
presence	of	NATO	in	Central	Eastern	Europe	and	the	Baltic	states	
should	be	avoided as	 it	 could	be	regarded	by	Russia	as	provoca-
tive. Before	 the	 Russian-Ukrainian	 conflict,	 Germany	was	 cau-
tious	about	organising	any	major	Article	5	military	exercises	on	
NATO’s	eastern	flank,	and	played	a	very	limited	role	in	such	exer-
cises	(e.g.	NATO’s	Steadfast	Jazz	exercise	in	2013).	after the rus-
sian aggression against ukraine, Germany still considered 
any actions aimed at significantly reinforcing nato’s east-
ern flank to be too provocative and likely to escalate tensions 
between russia and the West.	Ahead	of	 the	NATO	summit	 in	
Newport	(in	September	2014)	Germany	insisted	that	the	Alliance	
should	unilaterally	respect	the	provisions	of	the	NATO-Russia	po-
litical	documents	of	1997	and	2002.	Berlin	considered	any	major	
permanent	presence	of	NATO	forces	in	the	new	member	states	to	
be	 incompliant	with	 those	documents.	Germany	also	 advocated	
a	speedy	review	of	additional	NATO	activity	in	the	region.	
on the other hand Germany deemed it necessary – as part of 
a policy of reassurance towards poland and the Baltic states, 
but not as a policy of deterrence towards russia – to slightly 
strengthen the military presence on nato’s eastern flank, 
including its own engagement, according to the provisions 
of the nato-russia documents.	Thus,	in	2014	Germany	partici-
pated	in	NATO’s	increased	activity	in	the	Baltic	states,	Poland	and	
Romania:	 in	 the	 Standing	NATO	Mine	Countermeasures	Group	
One	(SNMCMG1)	operating	on	the	Baltic	Sea;	in	NATO’s	additional	
AWACS	surveillance	flights	over	Poland	and	Romania;	and	in	the	
air	policing	mission	in	the	Baltic	states.25	Along	with	Poland	and	
25	 In	 June	 and	 July	 2014,	 a	German	Elbe-class	 replenishment	 ship	 served	 as	
a	 command	 ship	and	flagship	 to	 the	SNMCMG1.	Between	August	 and	De-
cember	 2014,	 a	 German	 Frankenthal-class	 mine	 hunter	 participated	 in	
SNMCMG1.	 German	 soldiers	were	 involved	 in	NATO’s	 additional	 AWACS	
flights	over	Poland	and	Romania.	Between	September	and	December	2014,	
six	German	Eurofighter	aircraft	were	on	duty	as	part	of	the	Baltic	Air	Polic-
ing	mission:	four	operated	from	the	Estonian	base	in	Ämari,	and	two	from	
the	Neuburg/Donau	base	in	Germany.	
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Denmark,	Germany	also	agreed	to	increase	the	readiness	and	ca-
pabilities	of	 the	Multinational	Corps	Northeast	 in	Szczecin,	Po-
land.	In	2015	German	troops	are	scheduled	to	take	part	in	military	
exercises	in	Poland	and	the	Baltic	states	as	part	of	the	stepped-up	
rotating	allied	military	presence	on	NATO’s	eastern	flank.	
2. Germany’s regional security policy – challenges for 
the allies
Germany is a key ally on whom the stability and peace on na-
to’s eastern flank largely depend. an increased German po-
litical and military involvement in the Baltic sea region and 
central eastern europe and a demonstration to russia that 
Berlin is prepared to react strongly, could discourage any ag-
gressive russian action on nato’s eastern flank. however, 
Germany’s current policy poses challenges for nato’s cohe-
sion, the security of the eastern member states and the devel-
opment of regional military co-operation.	
(1) more uncertainty? As	 the	 Russian-Ukrainian	 conflict	 has	
demonstrated,	for	Moscow	Germany	is	the	most	important	NATO	
and	EU	member,	which	is	increasingly	determining	the	regional	
and	European	security	architecture,	especially	in	the	face	of	the	
US	 shift	 towards	 the	Asia-Pacific	 region,	 the	 security	problems	
in	other	regions,	and	the	perceived	weakness	of	the	administra-
tion	 of	 President	 Barack	 Obama.	Moscow’s	 moves	 to	 date	 have	
been	aimed	at	keeping	the	former	Soviet	republics	within	Russia’s	
sphere	 of	 political,	 economic	 and	 military	 influence	 –	 through	
a	 consolidation	 within	 the	 Eurasian	 Union,	 and	 the	 Collective	
Security	Treaty	Organisation	(CSTO).	However,	moscow’s long-
term, maximum objective is to change the european security 
architecture and to undermine the us-european alliance and 
the credibility of nato.	Moscow	hopes	that	Germany	will	be	the	
main	actor	in	charge	of	managing	the	crisis	in	Europe	stemming	
from	more	or	less	open	Russian	aggressive	action	against	a	NATO	
member	 state	 in	 the	 Baltic	 region	 and	 Central	 Eastern	 Europe.	
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Moscow	expects	that	 in	such	a	case	Germany	will	seek	to	avoid	
an	escalation	of	the	conflict	and	will	look	for	‘political	solutions’,	
de facto to	the	detriment	of	the	sovereignty	of	the	states	attacked,	
and	at	the	expense	of	NATO’s	collective	defence	principle. antici-
pating this kind of reaction from Germany, russia may feel 
encouraged to test nato’s cohesion and its ability to act in 
the Baltic sea region and in the central eastern europe, and 
try to pursue its strategic objectives.	
Germany’s policy to date, which	has	been	about	de-escalating	the	
conflict	in	Ukraine	on	the	one	hand,	and	limiting	efforts	to	militar-
ily	strengthen	NATO’s	eastern	flank	on	the	other,	combined with 
reports about the Bundeswehr’s problems with armament and 
military equipment, has given rise to questions in poland and 
the Baltic states about how Germany would respond political-
ly and militarily if russia were to undertake more aggressive 
action. Despite	assurances	that	Germany	will	show	solidarity	and	
act	according	to	Article	5,	its	actual	reaction	is	difficult	to	predict,	
and	may	depend	 on	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 determined	by	 internal	
German	 politics	 (e.g.	 approaching	 state	 or	 federal	 elections,	 the	
composition	of	the	ruling	coalition,	and	the	mindset	of	the	German	
decision-makers),	 the	 regional	 situation	 (reaction	 to	 Russian	 ac-
tions	by	NATO’s	eastern	members),	and	by	Russia	itself	(the	degree	
of	 success	 of	 Russian	 disinformation	 campaigns	 in	 Germany).26	
however, the very fact that the allies in the Baltic sea region 
and central eastern europe are having doubts about the pos-
sible German reaction in times of conflict is undermining the 
sense of security on nato’s eastern flank. 
(2) closer military co-operation in the region? In	view	of	a	clos-
er	 French-British	 military	 co-operation,	 Germany has been 
seeking to develop military co-operation with the smaller 
26	 Anton	Trojanovski,	 ‘Kreml	startet	Propaganda-Offensive	 in	Deutschland’,	
22	 August	 2014,	 http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article131499923/Kreml-
startet-Propaganda-Offensive-in-Deutschland.html	
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and medium-sized allies and partners, also from the Baltic 
sea region and central eastern europe.	The	‘framework	nation	
concept’	 that	Germany	has	been	pushing	through	in	NATO	also	
aims	at	supplementing	Germany’s	military	capabilities	by	the	mil-
itaries	of	the	smaller	partners.	This	would	mean	the	gradual	in-
tegration	of	the	armed	forces,	military	infrastructures	and	arms	
industries	in	the	region,	with	Germany	providing	framework	ca-
pabilities.	NATO’s	 eastern	members	 are	 thus	 facing	 a	dilemma.	
On	 the	one	hand,	Germany	 is	an	 increasingly	 important	ally	 in	
NATO	and	–	despite	the	Bundeswehr’s	problems	as	reported	in	the	
autumn	of	2014	–	the	ally	with	the	largest	military	potential	and	
most	significant	economic	interests	in	the	region.	Moreover,	the	
German	military	presence	in	the	Baltic	states	and	Central	Eastern	
Europe	is	crucial	for	NATO’s	policy	of	deterrence	–	irrespective	of	
Germany’s	political	and	military	limitations.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	NATO’s	eastern	members	are	facing	the	question:	is	it	worth	
investing	 in	 military	 co-operation	 with	 Berlin	 and	 becoming	
militarily	dependent	on	it,	when	it	is	unclear	whether	Germany	
can	be	 relied	on	politically	and	militarily	 in	 conflict	 situations?	
the uncertainty about Germany’s reaction in the event of 
a crisis or conflict in the region has contributed to the am-
bivalent attitudes of the smaller and medium-sized part-
ners towards developing far-reaching military-technical 
co-operation with Germany.	As	a	 result,	 those	 states	are	pre-
pared	to	enhance	their	interoperability	with	the	Bundeswehr,	e.g.	
through	joint	exercises	and	training.	However,	they	are	sceptical	
about	increasing	their	dependence	on	Germany	and	about	deeper	
military-technical	co-operation	and	integration,	which	is	Berlin’s	
long-term	objective,	for	instance	in	terms	of	purchasing	joint	plat-
forms,	with	joint	crews	and	using	them	operationally	(e.g.	in	the	
case	 of	 navies)	 or	 creating	 joint	 units	 and	 command	 structures	
within	 the	 framework	 of	 bilateral	 or	 multilateral	 co-operation	
outside	NATO.	
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